This paper analyzes the market microstructure of the European Climate Exchange, the largest EU ETS trading venue. The ECX captures 2=3 of the screen traded market in EUA and more than 90% in CER. 2009 Trading volumes total e22 billion and are growing, with EUA transactions doubling, and CER volume up 61%. Spreads range from e0:02 to e0:04 for EUA and e0:04 for actively traded CER. Market impact estimates imply that an average trade will move the EUA market by 1:06 euro centimes and the CER market 1:45. The proportion of the EUA spread due to adverse selection reaches 76%: Our …ndings of highly autocorrelated trade direction and short time interval between trades imply evidence of strategic trading by informed institutional traders. Both Granger-Gonzalo and Hasbrouck information shares imply that approximately 90% of price discovery is taking place in the ECX futures market compared to the BlueNext spot market. We …nd imbalances in the order book help predict returns for up to three days. A simple trading strategy that enters the market long or short when the order imbalance is strong is pro…table even after accounting for spreads and market impact.
Introduction
The largest market for carbon trading is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a cap and trade scheme that emerged out of the Kyoto Protocol. European Union Allowances (EUA), the primary compliance instrument, and project based credits called Certi…ed Emission Reductions (CER), are currently traded on eight major exchanges, BlueNext, Climex, the European Climate Exchange (ECX), European Energy Exchange (EEX), Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA), Green Exchange, Gestore del Mercato Elettrico (GME) and Nord Pool.
The ECX has, since the start of carbon exchange trading in 2005, been the leading venue. In 2009, the ECX processed 65:6% of the screen based trading volume in EUA and 91:6% in CER.
The current paper analyzes the market microstructure of the ECX and contrasts it with more mature commodity markets. We …nd that, after less than …ve years of trading, the ECX is now as liquid as markets like cocoa and gasoil. Furthermore, the futures market dominates price discovery as in many other commodity markets.
There are very few intra-day analyses of carbon emissions market. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) is the …rst market microstructure study of EUA futures. They analyzed the liquidity and price discovery of two EUA futures markets, ECX and Nord Pool for the Phase I 2005 Phase I -2007 . They …nd that their bid-ask spread estimate in the market has narrowed, and the more liquid ECX dominates the contribution to price discovery. Rittler (2009) studies price discovery and volatility spillovers between the EUA spot and futures market in the …rst year of Phase II. Medina, Pardo Tornero and Pascual (2012) calculate bid ask spreads for Phase I and Phase II EUA.
EUA prices collapsed well before the end of Phase I due to an excess supply of credits, and allowances could not be banked. These obstacles inhibited market liquidity. The total volume of EUA futures trading during [2005] [2006] [2007] was approximately 1; 500 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MMtCO2e), which is less than half of the volume traded in the single year 2009. EUA prices have stabilized in the Phase II compliance period, 2008 II compliance period, -2012 . For these reasons, we believe that a comprehensive market microstructure analysis of Phase II carbon trading is needed.
We extend the carbon pricing literature by analyzing market impact as well as spreads. While previous studies focused only on the EUA market, we also explore the CER market. We examine the price discovery contribution across spot and futures markets, a question which is not addressed by Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) . Finally, we examine the predictive content of order imbalances for future EUA returns.
Our tick data from the ECX includes only trade prices, volumes, and the direction of trade initiation. To estimate the spreads, we use Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman's (1997) GMM approach. Spreads on the most liquid contracts are a little more than twice the minimum tick increment, with December 2009 expiry spreads averaging e0:0210 for EUA and e0:0435 for CER.
The more illiquid 2011 and 2012 expiries are as one-and-a-half times as large.
The model allows us to examine the contents of the spread, the adverse selection cost and the cost of supplying liquidity. The median proportion of the EUA spread due to adverse selection is 76% which is extremely large compared to the 36% for the spread of NYSE-listed stocks documented by Madhavan et al (1997) . The autocorrelation of the trade direction is around 0.6 through year, which is again much higher than that of NYSE-listed stocks of 0.37.
Our …ndings, 1. highly positively autocorrelated trade direction, 2. short time interval between trades, and 3. large proportion of adverse selection component, jointly imply evidence of strategic trading by informed institutional traders. And in fact, ECX is an institutional market. Our …ndings give additional empirical support to Chung, Li and McInish (2005) which document that 1. serial correlation in trade direction are positively and signi…cantly related to the probability of information-based trading and 2. shorter intervals between trades induces stronger positive serial correlation in trade direction.
The model also provides a measure for market impact. We …nd a median market impact of e0:0106 for EUA and e0:0145 for CER.
We then examine the cointegration between ECX futures and the spot market which is dominated by BlueNext. From these estimates, we compute information shares using Hasbrouck's (1995) approach and an alternative decomposition based on Granger and Gonzalo (1995) . Using either measure, we …nd that the futures market is providing about 90% of price discovery.
Our …nal section examines return predictability when there is an imbalance between buyer and seller initiated trading volumes. We …nd persistence in returns lasting up to three days. We then devise a simple, pro…table trading strategy that enters at the close on days of large imbalances and exits at the next day's open.
We begin with a description of the competitive environment faced by the ECX in Section 2.
Then we analyze trading activity in EUA and CER in Sections 3 and 4. We estimate spreads for EUA and CER futures in Section 5. Section 6 models market impact for the most liquid EUA and CER contracts. Section 7 contains our information share analysis. Section 8 looks at return predictability and trading pro…ts from order book imbalances. Section 9 concludes.
Market Share
The two major instruments traded in the EU ETS are European Union Allowances (EUA) and Certi…ed Emission Reduction (CER) credits. Each security o¤sets one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent. Demand and supply are determined from national allocations distributed at the individual facility level. 1 We examine market share in each, starting with EUA. Nasdaq's acquisition of the rest of Nord Pool's power and derivatives business may reverse this.
EUA

CER
The primary market for Certi…ed Emission Reductions (CER) is project based. Article 12 of Kyoto created the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which enables developed countries to produce o¤sets through projects outside of Kyoto. There is now a well-established procedure for registering these credits through the United Nations. Mizrach (2010) estimates that, as of November 2010, 2; 463 projects have been approved which produce an annual average of 389:3 million CERs.
Once registered, credits can be traded in the secondary market to third parties. All of the exchanges which publicly report data also trade CERs. We tabulate trading volumes in spot, futures and options in Table 2. 1 There were 12; 242 installations in the EU registry which were allocated 1; 966 MMtCO 2 e in 2009.
[Insert 
EUA Futures Trading
As shown above, ECX is the leading market for both EUA and CER trading. Because the futures contracts are the most liquid, we focus primarily on the futures market, beginning with EUA. 
Screen trading
About 87% of trades are screen based. We turn to this …rst and will devote most of our analysis of spreads and price impact on this part of the market. Summary measures of trading volume are reported in Table 4. [Insert The ECX lists contract months in a quarterly cycle up to 2020. We report the …ve most active expiries which are all in December. The most active contract, the near-to-expiry December 2009 EUA, generated more than 238; 000 trades. That is nearly 1; 000 per trading day and is about 80% 
OTC trading
Trades can be entered into the ECX system by more than 100 ICE Futures Europe members or order routing through 42 energy clearing …rms. 2 We report these trading volumes in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 
CER Futures Trading
We now turn to the CER trading on the ECX. Contract speci…cations are listed in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 : ECX CER Contract Speci…cations]
As with EUA futures trading, the CER futures market is continuous, operated between 7:00-17:00 GMT and follows the same rules. Furthermore, 68% of trades are screen based. Spreads between EUA and CER are slightly above e1 on average.
Screen trading
We summarize 2009 trading activity in the four most active expiries in Table 7 . The most liquid contract is the December 2009 CER, the near-to-expiry contract as in EUA futures trading.
OTC trading
We summarize OTC trading activity in the active December contracts in Table 8 .
[Insert OTC trades have large lot sizes. On average, 72 contracts are exchanged in each OTC transaction, while through screen trading, there are only 9 contracts per trade. The market value of OTC trading activity is e3:2 billion, compared to e0:9 billion for screen trades.
As our emphasis shifts to measuring spreads and liquidity, we focus on the screen traded markets for the remainder of the paper.
Spread Estimation
The bid-ask spread is one of the important measures of market liquidity. Narrower spreads facilitate trades and lower transaction costs. Main di¢ culty in estimating spreads in commodity markets is that we usually have information on trades but not quotes. The ECX transaction data include the trade indicator variables which is not common in other commodity markets. Hence it is natural to implement the estimation method suggested by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) which makes the use of the trade indicator variables.
Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans
The …rst estimation approach we used to obtain the bid-ask spread is the method proposed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) . Their trade indicator model allows us to study the components of the spread.
The true price m t is interpreted as the post-trade expected value of the asset conditional upon public information, u t ; and the trade initiation variable, x t . We assume that u t is an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 2 u : The revision in beliefs is the sum of the change in beliefs due to new public information and order ‡ow innovations, so
where x t E[x t jx t 1 ] is the surprise in order ‡ow and > 0 measures the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent impact of the order ‡ow innovation. Higher values of indicate larger revisions for a given innovation in order ‡ow.
The transaction price can expressed as p t = m t + x t + u t ; where is the costs of supplying liquidity. It follows that the ask and bid price are
The bid-ask spread is p a t p b t = 2 ( + ) : In general, the transaction price p t is
where " t is an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 2 " . The term " t includes microstructural noise, such as stochastic rounding errors. Thus, the change in the transaction price is
A general Markov process is assumed for the trade initiation variable x t : The probability that a transaction at the ask (bid) follows a transaction at the ask (bid) is
The …rst-order autocorrelation of the trade initiation variable = E[
Then the conditional expectation of the trade initiation variable given public information are computed as
thus the conditional expectation E[x t jx t 1 ] = x t : Given this, (4) can be transformed into
where t = u t + " t " t 1 is a composite of public information and microstructural noises. We assume that t is an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and
The parameters of the model can be estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM) with the moment conditions implied in the model:
where
where e and e are GMM estimates of (7).
Spread Estimates
The intra-day prices used here are transaction prices from the ECX for the shrinks roughly 80% during the year which is greater than we observed from EUA.
The MRR model allows us to examine further aspects of the market. Table 9 reports the monthly parameter estimates of the model for EUA December 2009 Expiry.
[Insert The parameters and can be interpreted as the adverse selection cost and the cost of supplying liquidity, respectively. Both the costs of liquidity supply and the adverse selection costs tend to decrease from January to December. The median proportion of the EUA spread due to adverse selection is 76% which ranges from 61% of January to 84% of October. Our …nding indicates that information component highly dominates the bid-ask spread in the ECX. Its proportion is extremely large compared to the 36% for the spread of NYSE-listed stocks documented by Madhavan et al (1997) . The high adverse information component implies that the presence of relatively more informed traders increases the probability that a market maker would end up trading with an informed trader. Hence a market maker set relatively higher margin so that she can compensate her loss induced by adverse selection.
The autocorrelation of the trade direction is around 0.6 through year as we can see in Table   9 . This autocorrelation is much higher than that of the NYSE-listed stocks of 0.37 (Madhavan et al. 1997) . Furthermore, we …nd that the 85% of the time intervals between trades were less than one minute and 37% was less than one second. These …ndings, 1. highly positively autocorrelated trade direction, 2. short time interval between trades, and 3. large proportion of adverse selection component, jointly imply evidence of strategic trading by informed institutional traders (Kyle 1985 , Covrig and Ng 2004 , Kelly and Steigerwald 2003 . In fact, the ECX is an institutional market. There are 111 members active in ECX emissions contracts trading, and most of the members are large sized institutions. 6 The annual fee of $4500 and e2500 for ICE membership and ECX emissions trading privilege respectively, e¤ectively rules out the retail participation. 7 Our …ndings give additional empirical support to Chung, Li and McInish (2005) which document that 1. serial correlation in trade direction are positively and signi…cantly related to the probability of information-based trading and 2. shorter intervals between trades induces stronger positive serial correlation in trade direction. 5 We do not reject the null hypothesis for all months of the further expiry contracts of EUA and 2009 expiry CER, except for one case. 6 ICE member list availabe at https://www.theice.com/FuturesEuropeMembers.shtml 7 The documented ICE membership fee is for trade participants who are limited to trade on own account. The annual fee for general participants who is able to trade on behalf of their clients is $11,500.
Price Impact
Another measure of market liquidity is the price impact. The MRR model provides a measure for the price impact of a typical buyer initiated trade, which is
The magnitude of the MRR price impact measure is determined by two parameters, the degree of information asymmetry and the auto correlation of trade indicator variables . Higher implies larger revisions in public belief, i.e. larger price impact of the order ‡ow. If x t 1 = 1; highly positive increases the magnitude of revision in public beliefs of asset value, i.e. the price impact, induced by an arrival of a buy order at time t.
We expect that the thinner CER market will have a much larger trade impact. Table 10 reports the price impact of a typical buyer initiated trade estimated from MRR model for both EUA and CER. The standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping procedure.
[ The median impact for an EUA trade is e0:0106, with a range from e0:0079 for November to e0:0179 for January. As with the spreads, market impact generally falls during the trading year until the expiry month. The median impact for an CER trade is 1.4 times larger than for the EUA, e0:0145. The impact ranges from e0:0047 for June to e0:0305 for March.
Information Share
A growing share of EUA trading volume is being conducted in the spot market by BlueNext. We now ask in which market, futures or spot, is price discovery taking place? To answer this question, this section computes the Hasbrouck and Granger-Gonzalo information shares of the spot market in Paris with the futures market in London.
Concepts
Hasbrouck (1995) proposes a measure for one market's contribution to price discovery. Let p 1;t and p 2;t denote log observed spot and futures market prices, respectively. Since p 1;t and p 2;t are for the same underlying, they are assumed not to drift far apart from each other, i.e. the di¤erence between them should be I(0). And, each price series is assumed to be integrated of order one.
The price changes are assumed to be covariance stationary. This implies that they have a Wold representation,
where e t is a zero-mean vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances with covariance matrix , and is the polynomial in the lag operator. Applying the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition yields the levels relationship,
The matrix (1) contains the cumulative impacts of the innovation e t on all future price movements and (L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator. Then, a random walk assumption for the e¢ cient price and the common stochastic trend representation suggested by Stock and Watson (1988) enable (12) to be expressed as
where is a row vector of ones.
Since 0 p t = 0, where = (1; 1) 0 , is assumed to be stationary, 0 (1) = 0. And this implies that the rows of (1) is identical. Hence denoting = ( 1 ; 2 ) 0 as the common row vector of
(1), v t can be decomposed into 1 e 1;t and 2 e 2;t . i e i;t can be interpreted then as "part of the information v t re ‡ected in p i;t ". The variance of v t is 0 , and if is diagonal, i.e. e t are mutually uncorrelated, then market i's information share is de…ned as
where i is the ith element of , and 2 ei is the ith diagonal element in . Hence, information share suggested by Hasbrouck measures the proportion of the information attributed to two di¤erent observed prices. And he interprets this proportion as the contribution to the price discovery.
If is non-diagonal, the information share measure has the problem of attributing the covariance terms to each market. Hasbrouck suggests to compute the Cholesky decomposition of and measure the information share using the orthogonalized innovations. Let C be a lower triangular matrix such that C 0 C = . Then the information share for the ith market is
where 0 C i is the ith element of the row matrix 0 C. The resulting information share depends on the ordering of price variables. In the bivariate case, the upper (lower) bound of the IS i is obtained by computing the Cholesky factorization with the ith price ordered …rst (last).
Harris, McInish and Wood (2002) employ permanent-transitory component decomposition in-
troduced by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to measure price discovery. The Gonzalo-Granger common factor approach decomposes market prices as
where g t is the permanent component, h t is the transitory component, and A 1 and A 2 are factor loading matrices. As in Hasbrouck information shares setup, price series are assumed to be cointegrated. Thus, both price series are I(1), the error correction term is I(0) and g t is I(1). h t is I(0) and does not Granger cause g t in the long run. Gonzalo and Granger de…ne g t = 0 p t where 
In order to obtain IS and GG, the …rst step is to estimate the following vector error correction (VEC) model,
where is error correction vector, = (1; 1) 0 is cointegrating vector and e t is a zero mean vector of serially uncorrelated innovations with covariance matrix . Baillie, Booth, Tse and Zabotina (2002) shows that IS and GG can be obtained by utilizing estimated parameters 8 from (18). For diagonal,
where 2 i? is the ith element of ? . If the e t are correlated, we use the Cholesky factorization,
where 0 ? C i is the ith element of the row matrix 0 ? C, and
8 Rittler (2009) reports the Hasbrouck information share and the common factor weights, CF W 1 = j 2j j 2j+j 1j ; CF W 2 = j 1j j 2j+j 1 j : This measure would provide misleading results when has unfavorable sign. In some cases, it could give more weight to the price which moves away from the equilibrium.
Estimates
We estimate both information shares using hourly returns from the ECX EUA December 2009 futures expiry and the BlueNext EUA spot contract. We analyze the active seven hour overlap from 9:00 to 16:00 UK time for the two markets. After sampling every 60 minutes from the data set, we have a sample of 1; 880 observations.
In Table 11 , we report the relative volumes, in numbers of trades, for the futures and the spot market.
[Insert Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) show theoretically that relative liquidity determines the error correction representation, and this leads us to anticipate that the futures market should lead price discovery.
We start with the cointegration test and the estimation of (18). We verify in Table 12 that 11 out of 12 months are cointegrated with a statistically signi…cant error correction, 1 < 0, of the spot market to the futures contract. In every month but April 2009, there is some modest adjustment of the futures to the spot, 2 > 0.
[Insert Table 12 also reports Granger causality test results. We …nd unidirectional causality from the futures market to the spot market in every month but April. This could be a result of accounting procedures in the EU ETS. As noted by Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (2010), …rms report their actual emissions from the previous year at the end of March, and at the end of April, they have to surrender the previous year allowances. This seasonality may explain why the spot market contributes more to price discovery during the month of April. From those …ndings, we can conclude that the e¢ cient price of EUA is discovered …rst in the futures market, and the spot price follows. This result is consistent with the literature on commodity price discovery.
Return Predictability
In many markets, there is a robust …nding that order imbalances can predict future returns. Evans and Lyons (2002) …rst demonstrated this for foreign exchange, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) for stock returns, and in Treasury bonds, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) .
In this section, we study the return predictability in EUA December 2009 futures expiry. To determine whether order imbalances can predict future returns, we estimate the regression,
where r t denotes the overnight returns on date t: We initially use the last trade tick of the day and the opening tick of the next day to calculate the overnight return series. OIB t is the scaled order imbalance on day t. We measure it two ways: the daily number of buyer-initiated less seller-initiated trades, scaled by the total number of trades,
we also weight trades by dollar volume p t v t ,
We …nd, in Table 13 , that there are up to three days of return predictability from the closing tick to the opening price t days later. The persistence of order imbalances on returns is somewhat shorter than the …ve days found by Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) in NYSE stocks.
[Insert We …nd a very simple pro…table trading strategy using the raw order imbalance OIB t = P t j=1 x j . Our baseline is the case where you enter the market long (short) at the close if the imbalance in the order book for the day is positive (negative). You then exit the position at the next day's open. The …rst column of Table 14 reports the gain in Euros of trading a single contract using this strategy.
[Insert Table 14: Trading Strategies] Entering every day at the last tick and exiting at the next day's …rst tick, the strategy returns e4:36, with pro…ts on 54:4% of the trading days. If we add average spreads of e0:0221 to the strategy though, this removes all the pro…ts, leaving us with a loss of e6:16:
We next explore more selective entries based on a threshold of 1; 000 trade (in absolute value) order imbalance. This strategy only enters the market on 54 days, but paying the spread on entry and exit still leaves a pro…t of e1:79:
The ECX does provide a facility to trade at the open and settlement prices. Entering and exiting here avoids the spread and raises the pro…t to e6:32:
As a …nal exercise, we explore how well the strategy might scale up using our market impact estimates of e0:0108 per contract. Pro…ts peak at 3 contracts, totaling e8:46: If impacts are smaller at the open or close, this strategy could potentially scale further.
Conclusion
Carbon trading is a relatively new activity, but it already resembles the trading patterns of other more mature instruments.
Screen trading has come to dominate OTC transactions, and transactions have at least doubled in every year since trading began in 2005.
Exchange competition is vigorous between important global players, but at the moment a duopoly between the Intercontinental Exchange which bought the ECX in March 2010 and NYSE/Euronext (BlueNext) could be the equilibrium.
Competition appears to be keeping the spreads quite low, with Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans spreads on the most active EUA contracts about twice the minimum tick of e0:01. These estimates are two-thirds of the average spread on the most liquid 2007 contracts estimated by Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) . The yearly average spread of the December 2009 contract is 0:15%, which is comparable to the quoted spreads of cocoa and gasoil.
We …nd 1. highly positively autocorrelated trade direction, 2. short time interval between trades, and 3. large proportion of adverse selection component, jointly imply evidence of strategic trading by informed institutional traders. Our …ndings give additional empirical support to Chung, Li and McInish (2005) .
Market impact estimates also suggest a highly liquid market. A trade moves the market a little bit more than a tick on average for EUA and about one-and-a-half ticks for CER.
Information shares con…rm the trading volume …gures, with approximately 90% of the price discovery taking place on the ECX futures market compared to the BlueNext spot market. This con…rms the model of Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) that the more liquid market leads price discovery.
Order imbalances provide information about returns up to three days later, and we utilize a simple strategy that generates pro…ts at modest trade sizes.
Carbon trading may soon be a global activity, and our microstructure analysis suggests that this market is likely to absorb and bene…t from this additional liquidity. The market shares and volume are based on 2009 traded totals of EUA futures, spot and options transactions in MMtCO2e. We exclude EXAA from the table for space reasons. The data were collected directly from the exchanges. Only ECX and Nordpool report their OTC transactions. The table reports trading activity on screen traded EUA futures contracts from January to December 2009. We have excluded expiries with less than 500 contracts, although these are included in the totals. 1,398,671 311,180 104,843 206,412 7,202 2,040,304 e(millions) 18,292.19 4,294.14 1,507.05 3,182.77 116.11 27,528.78 The table reports trading activity on OTC EUA futures trades that clear on the ECX from January to December 2009. We have excluded expiries with less than 500 contracts, although these are included in the totals. The table reports trading activity on screen traded EUA futures contracts from January to December 2009. We have excluded expiries with less than 500 contracts, although these are included in the totals. The table reports trading activity on screen traded EUA futures contracts from January to December 2009. We have excluded expiries with less than 500 contracts, although these are included in the totals. 1 and 2 are the error correction coe¢ cients. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are statistically signi…cant at 5%;and 1%; respectively. The Johansen test is the trace test. The null hypothesis r is the number of cointegration relations at most. For r = 0 and r = 1, the 5% critical values are 12.53 and 3.84 respectively; 1% critical values are 16.31 and 6.51 respectively. The Granger causality test is an F -test for whether spot (futures) prices Granger cause futures (spot) prices. We reject the null hypothesis at 5%;and 1%; respectively. GG is the Granger-Gonzalo information share for the futures market, GG = 1 =( 1 + 2 ): The Hasbrouck shares are the upper and lower bounds and the average. The table reports estimates of the order imbalance regression (22) using daily EUA December 2009 futures. We measure the imbalance in number of transactions (OIBX) as de…ned in (23) or in e volume (OIBV) as de…ned in (24). The table explore trading strategies using the order book imbalance, OIB t = P t j=1 x j ; under di¤erent assumptions about entry and exit prices, the threshold order imbalance required for entry, trade size and market impact. x j is a binary variable indicating whether the trade is buyer (+1) or seller (-1) initiated. 
